The ethics assessment industry is currently dominated by the second version of the Defining Issues Test (DIT2). In this article, we describe an alternative assessment instrument called the Sphere-Specific Moral Reasoning and Theory Survey (SMARTS), which measures the respondent's level of moral development in several respects. We describe eight difficulties that an instrument must overcome in order to assess ethics classes successfully. We argue that the DIT2 fails to solve these problems, and that the SMARTS succeeds. The SMARTS was administered as pre-test and post-test during several semesters to ethics and non-ethics classes. Ethics students improved significantly more than non-ethics students in both moral theory choice and moral reasoning. Thus, ethics classes do indeed teach ethics.
Driven by the demands of accreditation agencies as well as by the eagerness of many (though hardly all) faculty members to make use of outcome-based performance measures to improve their teaching, 'assessment' is fast becoming the most popular word in academia. 1 Administrators are desperately seeking useable, accurate, economical assessment instruments for every discipline. Meanwhile, ethics is emerging from its long hibernation and becoming sexy again. Awakened by heightened concern about student plagiarism, ethical lapses in various professions, research misconduct, and political sleaziness, ethics is turning away from the sterile, meta-ethical slumbers of the mid-twentieth century, and turning toward practical questions. Applied ethics centers are proliferating and spawning conferences; the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and various professional societies are requiring ethics education; ethics questions are appearing on licensing exams; and so on. Together, the rise of assessment and the attempt to improve students' morals create a demand for instruments capable of assessing the contributions to moral development made by different sorts of ethics instruction.
Difficulties
Yet many of our colleagues smile indulgently when they discover that we are attempting to assess the impact of ethics classes on students' moral development. Why does this project seem quixotic to many academics? Some may be confused about the nature of our project. Thinking that our endpoint is behavior change, they are rightly skeptical of a survey's ability to measure changes in behavior. But our actual goal is more modest -to measure changes in moral thinking. Of course, there is the usual skepticism about assessing any class, and about the very existence of moral truths. But even academics who (a) accept that non-ethics classes are assessable and (b) accept that ethics is not illusory often (c) believe that ethics classes are not assessable. What are the peculiar difficulties of assessing ethics classes?
1. Theory is not enough. People using every moral theory 2 are found on both sides of every moral question. In many situations, a single moral theory is used to argue both that a certain option is morally required and that it is not required. Worse yet, some people with good moral theories reliably make bad decisions. Clearly, something in addition to theory is necessary to get to the right decision. Therefore, determining a person's moral theory is only part of the task of determining whether that person is morally well developed. 2. Moral development is uneven. People are not equally ethical across the board; they are better at dealing with some moral challenges than others. Despite philosophers' obsession with the unity of virtue, we all know benevolent yet intemperate people, courageous yet unjust people, and so on. This unevenness does not apply only to virtues and vices. Many people are far from virtuous with respect to some aspects of human life and even farther from virtuous with respect to other aspects. This poses a problem because measuring moral development in all aspects of a person's life is impractical. Assessment instruments cannot measure across a reasonably complete range of aspects of a person's life. Thus, assessment instruments will inevitably misevaluate many people. (2) above, they also use different theories within the same sphere.) Insofar as any moral theory may be attributed to people, it seems that no one is at just one level of moral development. Thus, any measuring instrument that purports to determine each person's (single) level of moral development is misguided. Such an instrument has an inappropriate aim based upon an obviously false assumption. 6. People have issues. Not only do people use different theories, they also have views about various hot-buttons issues which do not reflect their overall moral theories. Prejudices, stances associated with authority figures, residues of wonderful or traumatic experiences, and other firmly held beliefs may persist alongside overall theories which are incompatible with them. Assessment instruments will be misled insofar as their questions hit on such emotionally charged anomalies among the moral beliefs of the respondents. 7. People are ignorant. Many respondents have a very limited range of experiences, especially about the issues debated at the national level, and they are loaded with patently false beliefs about the world. Assessment instruments which ask about situations involving these beliefs will often elicit poor choices, and will therefore down-rank the respondents' levels of moral development. But the respondents' choices are evidence of ignorance about the world rather than indications of retarded moral development. Thus, assessment instruments are likely to come to mistaken conclusions about respondents. 8. The inner is not the outer. As is well known, actual decision-making involves implicit moral theories, intuitions, and/or emotions which differ from the moral theories people use when explaining or justifying their actions (Cushman et al., 2010) . For the purpose of measuring moral development, the implicit responses are the important ones when they determine action and differ from the explicit theories. Straightforwardly asking about reasons for action will elicit the explicit theories rather than the implicit responses. But how are implicit responses to be accessed and assessed?
Our stalking horse: The DIT2
The ethics assessment industry is currently dominated by the second version of the Defining Issues Test (DIT2) plus various instruments modeled upon it (Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a Rest et al., , 1999b Rest et al., , 2000 Thoma, 2002; Walker, 2002) . The goal of the DIT2 is to determine where to locate the respondent on the moral development path. The DIT2 consists of questions about scenarios similar to the well-known Heinz dilemma.
Respondents are presented with several questions related to the scenario, and asked to rate their importance on a Likert-type scale. Like any widely used survey, the DIT2 has its critics (Nucci, 2002; Puka, 2002) . It has been accused of bias against conservatives, for example (Emler et al., 1983) . Our own concerns about the DIT2 differ from the criticisms currently on the table. They arise from the eight difficulties of assessing ethics classes listed above.
1. Theory is not enough. The psychological theory underlying the DIT2 is called the Four-Component Model (FCM) because it takes decision-making to be a product of four components: moral judgment, sensation, motivation, and character. While these components are obviously interrelated, the FCM separates them because they do not typically develop at equal rates within a single individual. Sometimes a person perceives well, but judges badly, for example. The DIT2 focuses on the judgment component. It purports to measure a person's level of judgment. We are skeptical. Moral judgment is (or includes) the application of moral theories to perceived concrete situations using a reasoning process. Admittedly, these items are deeply interrelated, yet they can vary independently. The FCM acknowledges the independence of judgment and sensation; we think it should also acknowledge the independence of theory choice and reasoning. Some people do not correctly complete the practical syllogism because they have implausible premises; they correctly apply sophomoric moral theories. Other people fail because they reason badly from plausible premises; they apply sophisticated moral theories in inept ways. Like Kohlberg who criticized the DIT for lumping together two items which vary independently (content and structure), we criticize the DIT2 for lumping together theory choice and reasoning. Either the DIT2 measures a jumble of two independent constructs, or it ignores moral reasoning, and only actually measures the theory choices of respondents (Bebeau, 2002; Puka, 2002 This lack of consensus is another mark against the DIT2. 5. People are inconsistent. The FCM which underlies the DIT2 arranges moral theories in a hierarchy of increasing sophistication. According to the FCM, people do not use one theory for years and then discard it in favor of another, like ascending a ladder. Rather, people use several different theories at each point on the moral development path. Progress consists in using more and more sophisticated theories more and more often. The DIT2 accepts the view that almost everyone deploys a hodge-podge of incompatible moral theories for implicit decision-making. But because the FCM ranks these theories one above the next, it seems to imply that as individuals move from decision to decision they bounce back and forth among several different levels of moral development. According to the FCM, morally advanced people use better theories more often than morally underdeveloped people, but all use all sorts of theories to some extent. However, someone who moves rapidly from theory to theory is better described as confused or lacking commitment to any moral theory at all rather than someone at a particular point on a moral development path. This suggests that there is a problem with the FCM's picture of people using different moral theories in quick succession. Moreover, as we all know from personal experience and from talking with other people, moral theories are very firmly held (though inconsistently applied, as mentioned below). Like other fundamental beliefs, a person's underlying moral theory changes very rarely, and with great difficulty and pain. People typically hold fast to their fundamental normative beliefs despite evidence and arguments, stories and tears, and so on. But this observation is also difficult to reconcile with the FCM's picture of people using different moral theories in quick succession. 6. People have issues. The DIT2 uses only five scenarios (the DIT used only six scenarios, the DIT2's short version uses only three), and these scenarios concern issues about which people have strong feelings and firm beliefs. These are hotbutton issues for many people. Thus, there is a high likelihood that many respondents will give outlier answers to a significant part of the DIT2. That is, the DIT2's attempt to measure moral development is at least partially confounded by unrepresentative, idiosyncratic responses to isolated items. 7. People are ignorant. The DIT2 focuses on public policy issues. But except for a small coterie of VIPs, the moral choices actually confronting people concern the personal issues of everyday life. Most of us deal with micro-ethics rather than macro-ethics. Moreover, many people are uninformed or misinformed about questions of public policy. Because they lack an accurate grasp of the relevant facts, the positions people take on public policy may often be influenced by ideological and political factors that are unrelated to the moral theories and reasoning they use to make daily decisions in their own lives. Finally, the current polarization of politics and ideological cast of public discourse tend to decouple people's stands on public policy from the moral theories and reasoning they use to make decisions in their own lives. So by focusing on public policy issues, the DIT2 is not asking the right sort of questions. 8. The inner is not the outer. Everyone agrees that moral decision-making is at least partially a function of implicit responses. Decisions do not simply issue from theories explicitly endorsed by agents. The DIT2 addresses the problem of accessing and assessing these implicit responses by making brief, cryptic references to various theories in its multiple-choice answers. The rationale behind this 'fragment strategy' is that respondents who are already thinking about a scenario along the lines of a certain theory will recognize the reference, but other respondents will just pass over that answer (Narvaez and Bock, 2002) . We believe that the fragment strategy fails because cryptic references typically evoke all sorts of lines of thought -meaningful and otherwise. Rather than accessing the actual, implicit responses of the respondents, we believe that the fragment strategy of the DIT2 is just generating noise.
Our alternative instrument: SMARTS
We are in the process of developing an instrument to measure moral development which will avoid the eight difficulties of assessing ethics classes. Thus, SMARTS measures moral theory choice (which we shall call 'theorizing') and moral reasoning independently in the following way. When respondents choose among the proffered explanations, they display tendencies to choose either sophisticated or sophomoric theories. They also display tendencies to choose either right or wrong applications of whatever moral theories they choose. Respondents who use sophisticated moral theories but nevertheless choose what their theories would take to be the wrong answers have a deficiency of reasoning, but not of theorizing. Conversely, respondents who use sophomoric moral theories but nevertheless choose what their theories would take to be the right answers have a deficiency of theorizing, but not of reasoning. Thus, SMARTS treats theorizing and reasoning as two different constructs. We do not measure every aspect of moral decision-making, but by allowing for the possibility that people can apply sophomoric theories well or sophisticated theories badly, SMARTS measures more than the DIT2.
2. Moral development is uneven. Following Aristotle, we take human life to consist in collections of overlapping, yet different spheres, each concerned with a different package of goods, passions, and actions. Courage consists in thinking, feeling, and acting well in situations involving physical risk; temperance consists in thinking, feeling, and acting well in situations involving sensual pleasure; and so on (Nussbaum, 1988) . Some people are good at reasoning about sensual pleasure, but bad at reasoning about physical risk, others the reverse. Each question of SMARTS concerns a scenario which falls into one of the following three spheres of human life: (a) sensual pleasure, (b) deception and cheating, (c) helping others. From a virtue perspective, these are the spheres governed by temperance, justice, and benevolence. Thus, SMARTS tests the moral theorizing of respondents, independently in these three spheres, and similarly for the respondents' moral reasoning. Thus, SMARTS allows for the possibility that a respondent is a morally sophisticated theorizer with respect to temperance, but a naïve theorizer with respect to justice, for example. Again, although we do not measure every aspect of human life, we do separate out several important aspects. Unlike the DIT2, we do not attempt to measure all aspects together, but instead allow for uneven moral development with respect to different spheres of human life. 3. Experts disagree in theory. SMARTS takes utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics to be sophisticated moral theories; egoism, relativism, and the care ethics to be sophomoric moral theories; and the appeal to authority as something other than a moral theory. Unlike the DIT2 ranking, the SMARTS ranking is uncontroversial among ethicists. 5 Almost every introductory ethics textbook published in the last few decades ranks these theories as we do, with the following caveats. First, care ethics is not directly disparaged, but partiality is disparaged, and care ethics is a sort of partiality. Second, the appeal to the authority of God is typically listed as a moral theory -Divine Command theory. However, Divine Command theory instructs its adherents to follow God's orders rather than to use a moral theory as a guide to making one's own decisions. Actually using the implicit theory to make a choice brings the implicit response closer to consciousness. Only after the respondents answer the toss-up question does SMARTS offer alternative rationales for the answer. Hopefully, one of these rationales will dovetail with the respondent's fully-activated, implicit response.
We began by listing eight reasons for skepticism about assessments of ethics classes. We have argued that the DIT2 fails to address these worries adequately, and that our competing instrument, SMARTS, does a better, though not perfect job.
Administration of the survey
SMARTS has been under development off and on for 5 years. Questions which yielded idiosyncratic answers were replaced in successive incarnations of SMARTS. Ethicists were informally consulted at several points to ensure that the 280 explanations of why choices in the scenarios would be right or wrong accurately represented the seven moral theories SMARTS utilizes. A panel of philosophy graduate students sorted the 20 questions into the three spheres of human life, and the 280 explanations into the seven moral theories to confirm that the questions and explanations were correctly categorized. Focus groups of graduate students and undergraduates also helped to refine the instrument. Wordsmiths reviewed the entire test in order to eliminate misleading or button-pushing phrases. Versions of SMARTS have been administered to college classes near the beginning and end of nine semesters. Incomplete, incorrectly completed, and unmatched surveys were excluded. We have used only matched-pairs of correctly completed pre-and post-tests.
For each question, the participant was given a moral theory score based on the level of theory represented by their chosen response (sophisticated theory = 2, sophomoric theory = 1, no theory = 0). The participant was also given a moral reasoning score based on the use of theory as represented by their chosen response (good use of theory = 2, bad use of theory = 1, no use of theory = 0). Total moral theory and reasoning scores were computed by summing the moral theory and reasoning scores from each question.
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As shown in Table 1 , Versions 1 and 2 of SMARTS were administered to 'Introduction to Ethics' classes. Version 3 of SMARTS was administered not only to several 'Introduction to Ethics' classes, but also to 'Beginning Philosophy' classes and 'Logic' classes. All three sorts of classes enroll similar student populations and are taught by philosophers, but 'Beginning Philosophy' classes present non-ethical theories and 'Logic' classes teach non-moral reasoning. Thus, 'Beginning Philosophy' students and 'Logic' students make suitably matched control groups for the 'Introduction to Ethics' classes. Version 4 of SMARTS was administered in a multi-center, multi-class-type trial. Version 5 of SMARTS was an expanded version, primarily aimed at improving the reliability of the instrument. In the present article, we present data obtained via Version 6 of SMARTS which was administered at the beginning and end of the Spring 2013 semester at four universities to a broad range of classes.
Reliability of SMARTS
Reliability is a measure of consistency or repeatability of a survey. An important form of reliability is internal reliability (whether the questions are all measuring the same trait) as measured by Cronbach's alpha (Babbie, 2011; Carmines and Zeller, 1991; Dane, 2011) .
As shown in Table 2 , the six subscales of SMARTS all have relatively low levels of internal reliability, but the overall scales of theorizing and reasoning are close to the generally acceptable level of 0.70. Overall reliability has increased substantially since Version 3 (S10-S11) where theory and reasoning scores were .33 and .26, respectively. The results discussed below suggest that although SMARTS overall scales and subscales are not yet as reliable as we would like, SMARTS is able to show the effect of interventions such as ethics instruction.
We hypothesized that people's moral theorizing and reasoning develop independently of each other, and independently within the spheres of human life. Thus, we expected that ethics classes would produce different results in respondents' theorizing and reasoning within each of the three spheres. We measured these differences. As shown in Table 3 , all subscale difference scores are significantly correlated with overall theory and reasoning difference scores. However, while difference scores for some subscales exhibit a robust relationship, others are not related to one another, which could suggest that improvement in the subscales, while related to the overall scale, is not necessarily related to improvement in other subscales. These relationships between the overall scales and subscales provide preliminary support for the hypothesis of independent moral development.
Results of SMARTS
A central question of this article is whether the intervention of an ethics class improves thinking about ethics. We tested this through a comparison of the pre-and post-test results of matched-pairs of surveys with respect to theorizing and reasoning in each of three spheres. Do the mean scores on the subscales increase significantly more in ethics classes than in non-ethics classes? As shown in Table 4 , independent samples t-tests revealed that participants' overall theorizing and reasoning scores improved during the semester in ethics classes. The overall difference score measures, and the measures in the justice and temperance spheres (though not the benevolence sphere) were marginally to significantly higher in ethics classes when compared to non-ethics courses.
Although the reliability of the scales and subscales of SMARTS could improve, SMARTS is able to show the effect of interventions. These statistically significant changes in theory and reasoning scores are unlikely to be due to chance. SMARTS is measuring something. The fact that students in ethics classes improve in moral theorizing and reasoning more on average than students in the control group indicates that this improvement is produced by instruction in ethics. To answer the question of this article's title, ethics classes do teach ethics.
Discussion
We initially described eight problems peculiar to the assessment of ethics classes, and argued that the DIT2 fails to overcome these obstacles. When introducing the SMARTS, we emphasized its ability to succeed where the DIT2 fails. The results from our Spring 2013 administration of the SMARTS demonstrate the SMARTS' ability to reveal ethical development when an intervention -in this case an ethics course -has been implemented. Some ethics instructors maintain that ethics courses improve the moral thinking of students. By requiring ethics instruction, accreditation agencies and professional organizations implicitly concur. Our study provides modest backing for their claims. Overall, students in ethics classes experienced mild gains in moral reasoning and somewhat greater gains in theorizing. Similar gains were not seen in the control group. Indeed, students in the control group did not improve in moral theorizing or reasoning at all. We have substantiated the claim that ethics classes mildly improve the moral thinking of students. This is no surprise; studies using the DIT2 have found similar results. Since we used a different instrument and measured different aspects of ethics, our study adds an increment of independent confirmation to the existing literature, and some further specificity. Caveats: Although we have shown that moral thinking can be taught, we have certainly not settled the longstanding question of whether virtue can be taught (Plato, 1980 ), for we have not shown that ethics classes improve moral passions, perceptions, or behavior. We have also shown nothing about the effectiveness of web-based ethics instruction or ethics modules imbedded within non-ethics courses. As usual, further research is needed.
The fact that these improvements are small should not be surprising or disheartening. Since almost half of the students started the class at the highest level of theorizing and more than a third started at the highest level of moral reasoning, possible improvement was limited. Moreover, by the time students get to college, they have been exposed to moral education (in many cases 'indoctrination' might be a better term) from parents, peers, churches, teachers, Hollywood, and other sources for at least 18 years. The fact that ethics instructors can make any positive impact at all in a one-semester course is an impressive and promising achievement. People have hot-buttons beliefs which do not reflect their moral theories. Assessment instruments will be misled insofar as their questions hit on such emotionally charged anomalies.
The DIT2 uses only five scenarios and these concern hot-button issues. Many respondents will give outlier answers to a significant part of the DIT2.
SMARTS dilutes the effect of hot-buttons issues by using twenty scenarios.
7
People are ignorant.
Many people have very limited experience about macro-ethical issues, and patently false beliefs about the world. Assessment instruments which ask about situations will therefore down-rank the respondent's level of moral development inappropriately.
The DIT2 focuses on macro-ethical issues. But people often lack an accurate grasp of the facts relevant to these issues. The moral choices actually confronting most people concern the personal issues of everyday life.
SMARTS asks about micro-ethical issues.
8
The inner is not the outer.
People typically use an implicit moral theory for decision-making which differs from the one they use when explaining or justifying their actions. But how are implicit theories to be accessed and assessed?
The DIT2 uses the 'fragment strategy' to access implicit theories. The rationale is that respondents who are already using a certain theory will recognize a cryptic reference, but other respondents will just pass over that answer. However, cryptic references typically evoke all sorts of lines of thought -meaningful and otherwise.
SMARTS accesses implicit theories by asking respondents what should be done in a situation before offering alternative rationales.
